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Abstract. The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the main research
fields in the Cybersecurity domain. This is due to (a) the increased depen-
dency on automated device, and (b) the inadequacy of general purpose
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to be deployed for special purpose
networks usage. Numerous lightweight protocols are being proposed for
IoT devices communication usage. One of the recent IoT machine-to-
machine communication protocols is Message Queuing Telemetry Trans-
port (MQTT) protocol. However, as per the authors best knowledge,
there are no available IDS datasets that include MQTT benign or attack
instances and thus, no IDS experimental results available.
In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of six Machine Learning (ML)
techniques to detect MQTT-based attacks. Three abstraction levels of
features are assessed, namely, packet-based, uni-directional flow, and bi-
directional flow features. An MQTT simulated dataset is generated and
used for the training and evaluation processes. The dataset is released
with an open access licence to help the research community further anal-
yse the challenges. The experimental results demonstrated the adequacy
of the proposed ML models to suit MQTT-based networks IDS require-
ments. Moreover, the results emphasise on the importance of using flow-
based features to discriminate MQTT-based attacks from benign traffic,
while packet-based features are sufficient for traditional networking at-
tacks.
Keywords: IoT · Machine Learning · MQTT
1 Introduction
A large number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and networks have been
utilised over the past years for different usage scenarios [13]. These use-cases
include healthcare [4], smart cities [5], supply chain [1] and farming [3]. With
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this extended use of IoT, new protocols are being deployed [17]. One of the new
prominent protocols used for machine-to-machine communication is MQTT [19].
Harsha et al. [8] discuss the different protocols used in various IoT networks,
which include MQTT. The authors analyse the security risks associated with
using MQTT. The authors results show that there are 53396 publicly available
and accessible MQTT devices [8]. Their work, alongside the work by Dinculeana˘
and Cheng [7], emphasise on the need for robust detection techniques for MQTT
attacks to overcome the security vulnerabilities.
As discussed in [10,9], IoT Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have different
requirements due to the uniqueness of the usage scenarios involved. IoT IDSs
are required to be flexible, extendable, and built using real or simulated traffic
suited for the intended usage [9].
In this manuscript, we aim at proposing and evaluating different Machine
Learning (ML) based MQTT IDS. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We generate a novel IoT -MQTT dataset and release it for public consump-
tion
– We analyse a novel MQTT dataset which includes both benign and attack
scenarios.
– We evaluate the significance of using high level (flow-based) features to build
the IDS.
– We assess the proposed model using six different ML techniques.
– We examine the different needs of MQTT-based versus generic attacks detec-
tion, which emphasise the special setup and, thus the needs of MQTT (IoT)
networks.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows; Section 2 discusses the
setup used for the dataset generation and provides an overview of the dataset
and the extracted features. Section 3 presents the results obtained by applying
different ML techniques to detect attacks. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 4.
2 Dataset
This section provides a description of the dataset gathered by the MQTT sensors
simulation. The dataset is published in [12]. The dataset consists of five recorded
scenarios; normal operation and four attack. The attacker performs four attack
and each is recorded independently. The attack are:
– Aggressive scan (Scan A)
– User Datagram Protocol (UDP) scan (Scan sU)
– Sparta SSH brute-force (Sparta)
– MQTT brute-force attack (MQTT BF)
The data was acquired using tcpdump. The packets are collected by recording
Ethernet traffic and then exporting to pcap files. The following tools were used
as follows:
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Fig. 1: MQTT Network Architecture [12]
– Virtual machines are used to simulate the network devices.
– Nmap is used for the scanning attacks.
– VLC is used to simulate the camera feed stream.
– MQTT-PWN [2] is used for the MQTT brute-force attack.
Figure 1 visualises the network components. The network consists of 12
MQTT sensors, a broker, a machine to simulate camera feed, and an attacker.
During normal operation, all 12 sensors send randomised messages using the
Publish MQTT command. The length of the messages is different between sen-
sors to simulate different usage scenarios. The messages themselves are randomly
generated. The camera feed is simulated using VLC media player which uses
UDP stream. To simulate a realistic scenario each of the network emulators
drop packets with 0.2%, 1% and 0.13%. During the four attack scenarios record-
ing, the background normal operation was left in action. The operating systems
of the different devices are as follows; Tiny Core Linux for the sensors, Ubuntu
for the camera & camera feed server and finally, Kali Linux for the hacker.
The value of this dataset is fourfold:
– The dataset simulates realistic MQTT IoT network in a normal operation
scenario.
– The dataset includes both generic networking scanning attacks, as well as,
MQTT brute-force attack.
– Researchers could use this dataset to build and evaluate IoT Intrusion De-
tection Systems.
– The dataset is the first to include MQTT scenarios and attacks data.
The dataset is provided in its raw capture format (.pcap files), as well
as processed features [12]. The features represent: (a) packet-based features,
(b) Unidirectional-based features, and (c) bidirectional-based features [18]. Each
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feature set is used exclusively, as discussed in Section 3. The basic packet ex-
tracted features are listed in Table 1, fourth column. The feature list for unidi-
rectional and bidirectional is listed in Table 1 columns five and six respectively.
It is important to note that for the bidirectional flows, some features (pointed
as *) have two values—one for forward flow and one for the backward flow. The
two features are recorded and distinguished by a prefix fwd for forward and
bwd for backward [12]. Furthermore, the distribution of instances is listed in
Table 2.
In order to avoid specific features influence, the following features are dropped.
These features are: source and destination IP addresses, protocol, and MQTT
flags. The data is split into 75% and 25% for training and testing, respectively.
Table 1: Features Description
Feature
Data
Type
Description Packet
Uni-
flow
Bi-
flow
ip src Text Source IP Address X X X
ip dest Text Destination IP Address X X X
protocol Text Last layer protocol X
ttl Integer Time to live X
ip len Integer Packet Length X
ip flag df Binary Don’t fragment IP flag X
ip flag mf Binary More fragments IP flag X
ip flag rb Binary Reserved IP flag X
prt src Integer Source Port X X X
prt dst Integer Destination Port X X X
proto Integer
Transport Layer protocol
(TCP/UDP)
X X
tcp flag res Binary Reserved TCP flag X
tcp flag ns Binary Nonce sum TCP flag X
tcp flag cwr Binary
Congestion Window
Reduced TCP flag
X
tcp flag ecn Binary ECN Echo TCP flag X
tcp flag urg Binary Urgent TCP flag X
tcp flag ack Binary
Acknowledgement TCP
flag
X
tcp flag push Binary Push TCP flag X
tcp flag reset Binary Reset TCP flag X
tcp flag syn Binary Synchronization TCP flag X
tcp flag fin Binary Finish TCP flag X
num pkts Integer
Number of Packets in the
flow
X *
mean iat Decimal Average inter arrival time X *
std iat Decimal
Standard deviation of inter
arrival time
X *
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Table 1 continued
Feature
Data
Type
Description Packet
Uni-
flow
Bi-
flow
min iat Decimal
Minimum inter arrival
time
X *
max iat Decimal
Maximum inter arrival
time
X *
num bytes Integer Number of bytes X *
num psh flags Integer Number of push flag X *
num rst flags Integer Number of reset flag X *
num urg flags Integer Number of urgent flag X *
mean pkt len Decimal Average packet length X *
std pkt len Decimal
Standard deviation packet
length
X *
min pkt len Decimal Minimum packet length X *
max pkt len Decimal Maximum packet length X *
mqtt messagetype Integer MQTT message type X
mqtt messagelength Binary MQTT message length X
mqtt flag uname Binary User Name MQTT Flag X
mqtt flag passwd Binary Password MQTT flag X
mqtt flag retain Binary Will retain MQTT flag X
mqtt flag qos Integer Will QoS MQTT flag X
mqtt flag willflag Binary Will flag MQTT flag X
mqtt flag clean Binary Clean MQTT flag X
mqtt flag reserved Binary Reserved MQTT flag X
is attack Binary
1 if the instance represents
an attack, 0 otherwise.
x x x
* represented as two features in the biflow features file (forward fwd and
backward bwd)
3 Experiments and Results
This section discusses the conducted experiments. Note that the code is available
on a GitHub repository 1.
Five-fold cross validation is used to evaluate each experiment. The metrics
used for evaluation are as follows [9]: (a) Overall accuracy, as defined in equa-
tion 1, such that True Positive (TP) represents the attack instances correctly
classified, True Negative (TN) represents the benign instances correctly classi-
fied, Positive (P) represents the number of attack instances and Negative (N)
represents the total number of benign instance.
OverallAccuracy =
TP + TN
P + N
(1)
1 https://github.com/AbertayMachineLearningGroup/MQTT ML
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Table 2: Dataset Instances Distribution
File Name
pcap file
size
Number of
Packets
Number of
Uni-flow
Instances
Number of
Uni-flow
Instances
Benign Attack Benign Attack Benign Attack
normal
192.5
MB
1056230
(3.42%)
0
171836
(59.01%)
0
86008
(54.78%)
0
scan A
(aggressive)
16.2 MB 70768
40624
(0.13%)
11560
39797
(13.67%)
5786
19907
(12.68%)
scan sU
(UDP)
41.3 MB 210819
22436
(0.07%)
34409
22436
(7.71%)
17230
22434
(14.29%)
sparta 3.4 GB 947177
19728943
(63.93%)
154175
28232
(9.7%)
77202
14116
(8.99%)
For each class, Precision, Recall, and F1 Score are computed as shown in
Equation 2, Equation 3, and Equation 4, respectively [9]. False Positive (FP)
represents benign instances falsely classified as attack and False Negative (FN)
represents the attack instances falsely classified as benign.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(2)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(3)
F1 =
2TP
2TP + FP + FN
(4)
Finally, the weighted average for precision, recall, and F1 score is calculated.
Six ML techniques are employed for the classification purpose. The ML tech-
niques are: Logistic Regression (LR) [], Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) , k-Nearest
Neighbours (k-NN) , Support Vector Machine (SVM) , Decision Trees (DT) and
Random Forests (RF) [21] [14] [16] [20] [15] [6] [11].
Table 3 details the overall accuracy of each of the ML techniques with packet,
uni-directional and bi-directional features. It can be observed the performance
rise accompanying flow-based features, both uni-directional and bi-directional.
This rise could further be visualised in Figure 2.
To further analyse the results, Table 4, Table 5 and, Table 6 show the de-
tailed precision, recall, and F1-score for each of the classifiers. Each classifier is
represented as a sub-table. Similar to Table 3, it is observed that the flow-based
features are strongly enhance the results.
Furthermore, it is recognised that the Benign and the MQTT-BF attack are
the two classes benefiting from flow features. This is reasoned by the fact that in
IoT networks normal/benign operations are usually uncomplicated. Therefore,
generic attacks are quite distinctive. However, MQTT-based attacks have simi-
lar characteristics to benign MQTT communication. Since MQTT-based attacks
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Table 3: Overall detection accuracy
Features
Packet Unidirectional Bidirectional
LR 78.87% 98.23% 99.44%
k-NN 69.13% 99.68% 99.9%
DT 88.55% 99.96% 99.95%
RF 65.39% 99.98% 99.97%
SVM (RBF Kernel) 77.4% 97.96% 96.61%
NB 81.15% 78% 97.55%
SVM (Linear Kernel) 66.69% 82.6% 98.5%
60
70
80
90
100
Packet Unidirectional Bidirectional
LR k-NN DT RF SVM (RBF Kernel) NB SVM (Linear Kernel)
Fig. 2: Overall detection accuracy trend using different ML techniques
rely on the available MQTT communication commands (i.e., publish, subscribe,
etc), it is challenging to discriminate attacks from normal operations where the
same commands are used. As a result, packet-based features in all the ML tech-
niques were not suitable for benign and MQTT-BF classification. This observa-
tion could further be observed in the trends charts for benign class, MQTT BF
class, and weighted average metrics in Figure 3, Figure 4 and, Figure 5.
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Fig. 3: Benign Class Trends
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Fig. 5: Weghted Average Trends
4 Conclusion and Future Work
This work aims at evaluating six different ML techniques as attack classifiers for
an MQTT case study. A simulated MQTT network was used for data collection.
Three features levels were extracted from the raw pcap files; packet, unidirec-
tional, and bidirectional. The experimental results showed that the flow-based
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features are better suited to discriminate between benign and MQTT-based at-
tacks due to their similar characteristics. The weighted average recall rose from
∼ 75.31% for packet-based features to ∼ 93.77% and ∼ 98.85% for unidirectional
and bidirectional flow features, respectively. While the weighted average preci-
sion rose from ∼ 72.37% for packet-based features to ∼ 97.19% and ∼ 99.04%
for unidirectional and bidirectional flow features. Therefore, the experiments
emphasised on the special challenges faced by IoT IDS, based on their custom
communication patterns. The challenges were demonstrated through the diffi-
culties to differentiate MQTT-based attack from normal operations.
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